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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-880
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JUDY MADSEN, et al., PETITIONERS v. WOMEN'S
HEALTH CENTER, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
florida
[June 30, 1994]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of an injunc-
tion entered by a Florida state court which prohibits
antiabortion protestors from demonstrating in certain
places and in various ways outside of a health clinic
that performs abortions.  We hold that the establishment
of a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street from which
demonstrators are excluded passes muster under the
First Amendment, but that several other provisions of
the injunction do not.

                      I
  Respondents operate abortion clinics throughout
central Florida.  Petitioners and other groups and
individuals are engaged in activities near the site of one
such clinic in Melbourne, Florida.  They picketed and
demonstrated where the public street gives access to the
clinic.  In September 1992, a Florida state court perma-
nently enjoined petitioners from blocking or interfering
with public access to the clinic, and from physically
abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic.  Six
months later, respondents sought to broaden the injunc-
tion, complaining that access to the clinic was still
impeded by petitioners' activities and that such activities
had also discouraged some potential patients from
entering the clinic, and had deleterious physical effects
on others.  The trial court thereupon issued a broader
injunction, which is challenged here.
  The court found that, despite the initial injunction,
protesters continued to impede access to the clinic by
congregating on the paved portion of the street-Dixie
Way-leading up to the clinic, and by marching in front
of the clinic's driveways.  It found that as vehicles
heading toward the clinic slowed to allow the protesters
to move out of the way, -sidewalk counselors- would
approach and attempt to give the vehicle's occupants
antiabortion literature.  The number of people congre-
gating varied from a handful to 400, and the noise
varied from singing and chanting to the use of loud-
speakers and bullhorns.
  The protests, the court found, took their toll on the
clinic's patients.  A clinic doctor testified that, as a
result of having to run such a gauntlet to enter the
clinic, the patients -manifested a higher level of anxiety
and hypertension causing those patients to need a
higher level of sedation to undergo the surgical proce-
dures, thereby increasing the risk associated with such
procedures.-  App. 54.  The noise produced by the
protestors could be heard within the clinic, causing
stress in the patients both during surgical procedures
and while recuperating in the recovery rooms.  And
those patients who turned away because of the crowd to
return at a later date, the doctor testified, increased
their health risks by reason of the delay.
  Doctors and clinic workers, in turn, were not immune
even in their homes.  Petitioners picketed in front of
clinic employees' residences; shouted at passersby; rang
the doorbells of neighbors and provided literature
identifying the particular clinic employee as a -baby
killer.-  Occasionally, the protestors would confront
minor children of clinic employees who were home alone.
  This and similar testimony led the state court to
conclude that its original injunction had proved insuffi-
cient -to protect the health, safety and rights of women
in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida, and surround-
ing counties seeking access to [medical and counseling]
services.-  Id., at 5.  The state court therefore amended
its prior order, enjoining a broader array of activities.
The amended injunction prohibits petitioners from
engaging in the following acts:
     -(1) At all times on all days, from entering the
premises and property of the Aware Woman Center
for Choice [the Melbourne clinic] . . . .
     -(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, imped-
ing, inhibiting, or in any other manner obstructing
or interfering with access to, ingress into and egress
from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
     -(3) At all times on all days, from congregating,
picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that
portion of public right-of-way or private property
within [36] feet of the property line of the Clinic
. . . .  An exception to the 36 foot buffer zone is the
area immediately adjacent to the Clinic on the east
. . . .  The [petitioners] . . . must remain at least [5]
feet from the Clinic's east line.  Another exception
to the 36 foot buffer zone relates to the record title
owners of the property to the north and west of the
Clinic.  The prohibition against entry into the 36
foot buffer zones does not apply to such persons and
their invitees.  The other prohibitions contained
herein do apply, if such owners and their invitees
are acting in concert with the [petitioners]. . . .
     -(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon,
on Mondays through Saturdays, during surgical
procedures and recovery periods, from singing,
chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bull-
horns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or
other sounds or images observable to or within
earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
     -(5) At all times on all days, in an area within
[300] feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching
any person seeking the services of the Clinic unless
such person indicates a desire to communicate by
approaching or by inquiring of the [petitioners]. . . .
     -(6) At all times on all days, from approaching,
congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or
using bullhorns or other sound amplification equip-
ment within [300] feet of the residence of any of the
[respondents'] employees, staff, owners or agents, or
blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any
other manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the
entrances, exits or driveways of the residences of
any of the [respondents'] employees, staff, owners or
agents.  The [petitioners] and those acting in concert
with them are prohibited from inhibiting or imped-
ing or attempting to impede, temporarily or other-
wise, the free ingress or egress of persons to any
street that provides the sole access to the street on
which those residences are located.
     -(7) At all times on all days, from physically abus-
ing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching,
pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting persons
entering or leaving, working at or using services at
the [respondents'] Clinic or trying to gain access to,
or leave, any of the homes of owners, staff or
patients of the Clinic.
     -(8) At all times on all days, from harassing,
intimidating or physically abusing, assaulting or
threatening any present or former doctor, health
care professional, or other staff member, employee or
volunteer who assists in providing services at the
[respondents'] Clinic.
     -(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging,
inciting, or securing other persons to commit any of
the prohibited acts listed herein.- Operation Rescue
v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664,
679-680 (Fla. 1993).
  The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the trial court's amended injunction.  626 So. 2d
664.  That court recognized that the forum at issue,
which consists of public streets, sidewalks, and rights-of-
way, is a traditional public forum.  Id., at 671, citing
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480 (1988).  It then
determined that the restrictions are content neutral, and
it accordingly refused to apply the heightened scrutiny
dictated by Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983) (To enforce a
content-based exclusion the State must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end).  Instead, the court analyzed the injunction to
determine whether the restrictions are -narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.-  Id.,
at 45.  It concluded that they were.
  Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court's opinion
was announced, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit heard a separate challenge to the
same injunction.  The Court of Appeals struck down the
injunction, characterizing the dispute as a clash -be-
tween an actual prohibition of speech and a potential
hinderance to the free exercise of abortion rights.-
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F. 3d 705, 711 (1993).  It stated
that the asserted interests in public safety and order
were already protected by other applicable laws and that
these interests could be protected adequately without
infringing upon the First Amendment rights of others.
Ibid.  The Court of Appeals found the injunction to be
content based and neither necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest nor narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.  Ibid., citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455,
461-462 (1980).  We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. ___
(1994), to resolve the conflict between the Florida
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over the
constitutionality of the state court's injunction.

                     II
  We begin by addressing petitioners' contention that
the state court's order, because it is an injunction that
restricts only the speech of antiabortion protesters, is
necessarily content or viewpoint based.  Accordingly,
they argue, we should examine the entire injunction
under the strictest standard of scrutiny.  See Perry
Education Assn., supra, at 45.  We disagree.  To accept
petitioners' claim would be to classify virtually every
injunction as content or viewpoint based.  An injunction,
by its very nature, applies only to a particular group (or
individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the
speech, of that group.  It does so, however, because of
the group's past actions in the context of a specific
dispute between real parties.  The parties seeking the
injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court
hearing the action is charged with fashioning a remedy
for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a
statute addressed to the general public.
  The fact that the injunction in the present case did
not prohibit activities of those demonstrating in favor of
abortion is justly attributable to the lack of any similar
demonstrations by those in favor of abortion, and of any
consequent request that their demonstrations be regu-
lated by injunction.  There is no suggestion in this record
that Florida law would not equally restrain similar
conduct directed at a target having nothing to do with
abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court
were directed at the contents of petitioner's message.
  Our principal inquiry in determining content neutrality
is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech -without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.-  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(upholding noise regulations); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505
U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 8) (-The government
may not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed-);
see also Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U. S. 221, 230 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S.
641, 648-649 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453
U. S. 490, 514-515 (1981) (plurality); Carey v. Brown,
447 U. S. 455, 466-468 (1980).  We thus look to the
government's purpose as the threshold consideration.
Here, the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners
incidental to their antiabortion message because they
repeatedly violated the court's original order.  That
petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding
abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some
invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated
the issuance of the order.  It suggests only that those in
the group whose conduct violated the court's order
happen to share the same opinion regarding abortions
being performed at the clinic.  In short, the fact that the
injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint
does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint
based.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988).
Accordingly, the injunction issued in this case does not
demand the level of heightened scrutiny set forth in
Perry Education Assn., 460 U. S., at 45.  And we
proceed to discuss the standard which does govern.

                     III
  If this were a content-neutral, generally applicable
statute, instead of an injunctive order, its constitutional-
ity would be assessed under the standard set forth in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, at 791, and similar
cases.  Given that the forum around the clinic is a
traditional public forum, see Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U. S., at 480, we would determine whether the time,
place, and manner regulations were -narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest.-  Ward,
supra, at 791.  See also Perry Education Assn., supra, at
45.
  There are obvious differences, however, between an
injunction and a generally applicable ordinance.  Ordi-
nances represent a legislative choice regarding the
promotion of particular societal interests.  Injunctions,
by contrast, are remedies imposed for violations (or
threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree.
See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629,
632-633 (1953).  Injunctions also carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do
general ordinances.  -[T]here is no more effective practi-
cal guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally.-  Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949).  Injunctions, of course,
have some advantages over generally applicable statutes
in that they can be tailored by a trial judge to afford
more precise relief than a statute where a violation of
the law has already occurred.  United States v. Paradise,
480 U. S. 149 (1987).
  We believe that these differences require a somewhat
more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles in this context.  In past cases evaluating
injunctions restricting speech, see, e.g., NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), Milk
Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S.
287 (1941), we have relied upon such general principles
while also seeking to ensure that the injunction was no
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals.  See
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393
U. S. 175 (1968); Claiborne Hardware, supra, at 912,
n. 47.  Our close attention to the fit between the
objectives of an injunction and the restrictions it imposes
on speech is consistent with the general rule, quite
apart from First Amendment considerations, -that
injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the
defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to
the plaintiffs.-  Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682,
702 (1979).  See also Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman,
433 U. S. 406, 418-420 (1977).  Accordingly, when
evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that
our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not
sufficiently rigorous.  We must ask instead whether the
challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.  See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, supra, at 916
(when sanctionable -conduct occurs in the context of
constitutionally protected activity . . . `precision of
regulation' is demanded-) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963)); 458 U. S., at 916, n. 52
(citing Carroll, supra, and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U. S. 589, 604 (1967)); Carroll,
supra, at 183-184.
  Both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia disagree
with the standard we announce, for policy reasons.  See
post, at 2 (Stevens, J.); post, at 8-14 (Scalia, J.).
Justice Stevens believes that -injunctive relief should
be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation,-
because injunctions are imposed on individuals or groups
who have engaged in illegal activity.  Post, at 2.
Justice Scalia, by contrast, believes that content-
neutral injunctions are -at least as deserving of strict
scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction.-  Post,
at 9.  Justice Scalia bases his belief on the danger
that injunctions, even though they might not -attack
content as content,- may be used to suppress particular
ideas; that individual judges should not be trusted to
impose injunctions in this context; and that an injunc-
tion is procedurally more difficult to challenge than a
statute.  Post, at 9-11.  We believe that consideration of
all of the differences and similarities between statutes
and injunctions supports, as a matter of policy, the
standard we apply here.
  Justice Scalia further contends that precedent
compels the application of strict scrutiny in this case.
Under that standard, we ask whether a restriction is
-`necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [is]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'-  Post, at 7
(quoting Perry Education Assn., 460 U. S., at 45).
Justice Scalia fails to cite a single case, and we are
aware of none, in which we have applied this standard
to a content-neutral injunction.  He cites a number of
cases in which we have struck down, with little or no
elaboration, prior restraints on free expression.  See
post, at 15 (citing cases).  As we have explained,
however, we do not believe that this injunction consti-
tutes a prior restraint, and we therefore believe that the
-heavy presumption- against its constitutionality does
not obtain here.  See n. 2, supra.
  Justice Scalia also relies on Claiborne Hardware and
Carroll for support of his contention that our precedent
requires the application of strict scrutiny in this context.
In Claiborne Hardware, we stated simply that -precision
of regulation- is demanded.  See 458 U. S., at 916
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Scalia
reads this case to require -surgical precision- of regula-
tion, post, at 16, but that was not the adjective chosen
by the author of the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens.
We think a standard requiring that an injunction
-burden no more speech than necessary- exemplifies
-precision of regulation.-
  As for Carroll, Justice Scalia believes that the
-standard- adopted in that case -is strict scrutiny,-
which -does not remotely resemble the Court's new
proposal.-  Post, at 17.  Comparison of the language
used in Carroll and the wording of the standard we
adopt, however, belies Justice Scalia's exaggerated
contention.  Carroll, for example, requires that an
injunction be -couched in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish the pin-pointed objective- of the injunction.
393 U. S., at 183.  We require that the injunction
-burden no more speech than necessary- to accomplish
its objective.  We fail to see a difference between the
two standards.
  The Florida Supreme Court concluded that numerous
significant government interests are protected by the
injunction.  It noted that the State has a strong interest
in protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical
or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); In re T. W., 551
So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).  The State also has a
strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order,
in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets
and sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of
all its citizens.  626 So. 2d, at 672.  In addition, the
court believed that the State's strong interest in residen-
tial privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U. S. 474 (1988), applied by analogy to medical privacy.
626 So. 2d, at 672.  The court observed that while
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychologi-
cal well-being of the -captive- resident, targeted picket-
ing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psycho-
logical, but the physical well-being of the patient held
-captive- by medical circumstance.  Id., at 673.  We
agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that the
combination of these governmental interests is quite
sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction
to protect them.  We now examine each contested
provision of the injunction to see if it burdens more
speech than necessary to accomplish its goal.

                      A

                      1
  We begin with the 36-foot buffer zone.  The state
court prohibited petitioners from -congregating, picket-
ing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering- any portion
of the public right-of-way or private property within 36
feet of the property line of the clinic as a way of
ensuring access to the clinic.  This speech-free buffer
zone requires that petitioners move to the other side of
Dixie Way and away from the driveway of the clinic,
where the state court found that they repeatedly had
interfered with the free access of patients and staff.
App to Pet. for Cert. B-2, B-3.  See Cameron v. John-
son, 390 U. S. 611 (1968) (upholding statute which
prohibited picketing that obstructed or unreasonably
interfered with ingress or egress to or from public
buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the
adjacent street sidewalks).  The buffer zone also applies
to private property to the north and west of the clinic
property.  We examine each portion of the buffer zone
separately.
  We have noted a distinction between the type of
focused picketing banned from the buffer zone and the
type of generally disseminated communication that
cannot be completely banned in public places, such as
handbilling and solicitation.  See Frisby, supra, at 486
(-The type of focused picketing prohibited by [the state
court injunction] is fundamentally different from more
generally directed means of communication that may not
be completely banned in [public places]-).  Here the
picketing is directed primarily at patients and staff of
the clinic.
  The 36-foot buffer zone protecting the entrances to the
clinic and the parking lot is a means of protecting
unfettered ingress to and egress from the clinic, and
ensuring that petitioners do not block traffic on Dixie
Way.  The state court seems to have had few other
options to protect access given the narrow confines
around the clinic.  As the Florida Supreme Court noted,
Dixie Way is only 21 feet wide in the area of the clinic.
App. 260, 305.  The state court was convinced that
allowing the petitioners to remain on the clinic's side-
walk and driveway was not a viable option in view of
the failure of the first injunction to protect access.  And
allowing the petitioners to stand in the middle of Dixie
Way would obviously block vehicular traffic.
  The need for a complete buffer zone near the clinic
entrances and driveway may be debatable, but some
deference must be given to the state court's familiarity
with the facts and the background of the dispute
between the parties even under our heightened review.
Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U. S., at 294.  Moreover, one
of petitioners' witnesses during the evidentiary hearing
before the state court conceded that the buffer zone was
narrow enough to place petitioners at a distance of no
greater than 10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and
leaving the clinic.  App. 486.  Protesters standing across
the narrow street from the clinic can still be seen and
heard from the clinic parking lots.  Id., at 260, 305.  We
also bear in mind the fact that the state court originally
issued a much narrower injunction, providing no buffer
zone, and that this order did not succeed in protecting
access to the clinic.  The failure of the first order to
accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration
in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader order.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978).  On balance, we
hold that the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic
entrances and driveway burdens no more speech than
necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at
stake.
 Justice Scalia's dissent argues that a videotape made
of demonstrations at the clinic represents -what one
must presume to be the worst of the activity justifying
the injunction.-  Post, at 2.  This seems to us a gratu-
itous assumption.  The videotape was indeed introduced
by respondents, presumably because they thought it
supported their request for the second injunction.  But
witnesses also testified as to relevant facts in a 3-day
evidentiary hearing, and the state court was therefore
not limited to Justice Scalia's rendition of what he
saw on the videotape to make its findings in support of
the second injunction.  Indeed, petitioners themselves
studiously refrained from challenging the factual basis
for the injunction both in the state courts and here.
Before the Florida Supreme Court, petitioners stated
that -the Amended Permanent Injunction contains fun-
damental error on its face.  The sole question presented
by this appeal is a question of law, and for purposes of
this appeal [petitioners] are assuming, arguendo, that a
factual basis exists to grant injunctive relief.-
Appellants' Motion in Response to Appellees' Motion to
Require Full Transcript and Record of Proceedings in
No. 93-0069 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.), p. 2.  Petitioners
argued against including the factual record as an appen-
dix in the Florida Supreme Court, and never certified a
full record.  We must therefore judge this case on the
assumption that the evidence and testimony presented
to the state court supported its findings that the pres-
ence of protesters standing, marching, and demonstrat-
ing near the clinic's entrance interfered with ingress to
and egress from the clinic despite the issuance of the
earlier injunction.

                      2
 The inclusion of private property on the back and side
of the clinic in the 36-foot buffer zone raises different
concerns.  The accepted purpose of the buffer zone is to
protect access to the clinic and to facilitate the orderly
flow of traffic on Dixie Way.  Patients and staff wishing
to reach the clinic do not have to cross the private
property abutting the clinic property on the north and
west, and nothing in the record indicates that petition-
ers' activities on the private property have obstructed
access to the clinic.  Nor was evidence presented that
protestors located on the private property blocked vehic-
ular traffic on Dixie Way.  Absent evidence that peti-
tioners standing on the private property have obstructed
access to the clinic, blocked vehicular traffic, or other-
wise unlawfully interfered with the clinic's operation,
this portion of the buffer zone fails to serve the signifi-
cant government interests relied on by the Florida
Supreme Court.  We hold that on the record before us
the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the private prop-
erty to the north and west of the clinic burdens more
speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic.

                      B
 In response to high noise levels outside the clinic, the
state court restrained the petitioners from -singing,
chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns,
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other
sounds or images observable to or within earshot of the
patients inside the [c]linic- during the hours of 7:30
a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays.  We
must, of course, take account of the place to which the
regulations apply in determining whether these restric-
tions burden more speech than necessary.  We have
upheld similar noise restrictions in the past, and as we
noted in upholding a local noise ordinance around public
schools, -the nature of a place, `the pattern of its nor-
mal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations . . . that
are reasonable.'-  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U. S. 104, 116 (1972).  Noise control is particularly
important around hospitals and medical facilities during
surgery and recovery periods, and in evaluating another
injunction involving a medical facility, we stated:
-`Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or
assembly plants.  They are hospitals, where human
ailments are treated, where patients and relatives
alike often are under emotional strain and worry,
where pleasing and comforting patients are principal
facets of the day's activity, and where the patient
and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered,
relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.'-  NLRB v. Bap-
tist Hospital, Inc., 442 U. S. 773, 783-784, n. 12
(1979), quoting Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437
U. S. 483, 509 (1978)  (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment).
 We hold that the limited noise restrictions imposed by
the state court order burden no more speech than neces-
sary to ensure the health and well-being of the patients
at the clinic.  The First Amendment does not demand
that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean
efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.  -If
overamplified loudspeakers assault the citizenry, govern-
ment may turn then down.-  Grayned, supra, at 116.
That is what the state court did here, and we hold that
its action was proper.

                      C
 The same, however, cannot be said for the -images
observable- provision of the state court's order.  Clearly,
threats to patients or their families, however communi-
cated, are proscribable under the First Amendment.
But rather than prohibiting the display of signs that
could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats, the
state court issued a blanket ban on all -images observ-
able.-  This broad prohibition on all -images observable-
burdens more speech than necessary to achieve the
purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients or their
families.  Similarly, if the blanket ban on -images ob-
servable- was intended to reduce the level of anxiety
and hypertension suffered by the patients inside the
clinic, it would still fail.  The only plausible reason a
patient would be bothered by -images observable- inside
the clinic would be if the patient found the expression
contained in such images disagreeable.  But it is much
easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a pa-
tient to stop up her ears, and no more is required to
avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic.
This provision of the injunction violates the First
Amendment.

                      D
 The state court ordered that petitioners refrain from
physically approaching any person seeking services of
the clinic -unless such person indicates a desire to
communicate- in an area within 300 feet of the clinic.
The state court was attempting to prevent clinic pa-
tients and staff from being -stalked- or -shadowed-
by the petitioners as they approached the clinic.  See
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 10-11) (-face-to-
face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an
appropriate target of regulation.  The skillful, and un-
principled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable,
including those accompanying children or those suffering
physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the
solicitation-).
 But it is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on
all uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services
of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may
be, without burdening more speech than necessary to
prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic.
Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is indepen-
dently proscribable (i.e., -fighting words- or threats), or
is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable
from a threat of physical harm, see Milk Wagon Drivers,
312 U. S., at 292-293, this provision cannot stand.  -As
a general matter, we have indicated that in public
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment.-  Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 322 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  The -consent- requirement
alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech
than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure
access to the clinic.

                      E
 The final substantive regulation challenged by peti-
tioners relates to a prohibition against picketing, demon-
strating, or using sound amplification equipment within
300 feet of the residences of clinic staff.  The prohibi-
tion also covers impeding access to streets that provide
the sole access to streets on which those residences are
located.  The same analysis applies to the use of sound
amplification equipment here as that discussed above:
the government may simply demand that petitioners
turn down the volume if the protests overwhelm the
neighborhood.  Grayned, supra, at 116.
 As for the picketing, our prior decision upholding a
law banning targeted residential picketing remarked on
the unique nature of the home, as -`the last citadel of
the tired, the weary, and the sick.'-  Frisby, 487 U. S.,
at 484.  We stated that -`[t]he State's interest in pro-
tecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society.'-  Ibid.
 But the 300-foot zone around the residences in this
case is much larger than the zone provided for in the
ordinance which we approved in Frisby.  The ordinance
at issue there made it -unlawful for any person to
engage in picketing before or about the residence or
dwelling of any individual.-  Id., at 477.  The prohibi-
tion was limited to -focused picketing taking place solely
in front of a particular residence.-  Id., at 483.  By con-
trast, the 300-foot zone would ban -[g]eneral marching
through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a
route in front of an entire block of houses.-  Ibid.  The
record before us does not contain sufficient justification
for this broad a ban on picketing; it appears that a
limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and num-
ber of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accom-
plished the desired result.

                     IV
 Petitioners also challenge the state court's order as
being vague and overbroad.  They object to the portion
of the injunction making it applicable to those acting -in
concert- with the named parties.  But petitioners them-
selves are named parties in the order, and they there-
fore lack standing to challenge a portion of the order
applying to persons who are not parties.  Nor is that
phrase subject, at the behest of petitioners, to a chal-
lenge for -overbreadth-; the phrase itself does not pro-
hibit any conduct, but is simply directed at unnamed
parties who might later be found to be acting -in con-
cert- with the named parties.  As such, the case is
governed by our holding in Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB, 324 U. S. 9, 14 (1945).  There a party subject to
an injunction argued that the order was invalid because
of a provision that it applied to -successors and assigns-
of the enjoined party.  Noting that the party pressing
the claim was not a successor or assign, we character-
ized the matter as -an abstract controversy over the use
of these words.-  Id., at 15.
 Petitioners also contend that the -in concert- provision
of the injunction impermissibly limits their freedom of
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.  See,
e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair
Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981).  But petition-
ers are not enjoined from associating with others or
from joining with them to express a particular view-
point.  The freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment does not extend to joining with others for
the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful
rights.

                      V
 In sum, we uphold the noise restrictions and the 36-
foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and drive-
way because they burden no more speech than neces-
sary to eliminate the unlawful conduct targeted by the
state court's injunction.  We strike down as unconstitu-
tional the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the private
property to the north and west of the clinic, the -images
observable- provision, the 300-foot no-approach zone
around the clinic, and the 300-foot buffer zone around
the residences, because these provisions sweep more
broadly than necessary to accomplish the permissible
goals of the injunction.  Accordingly, the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court is

      Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.